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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
REDWOOD LAND COMPANY,
partnership,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

fl

vs.
FARRELL W. KIMBALL and
MRS. FARRELL W. KIMBALL
Defendants,
MRS. FARRELL W. KIMBALL,
Appellant.

Case No.
10911

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant and appellant, Mrs. Farrell W. Kimball fails to state all of the pertinent facts.
ln her petition for intermediate appeal from
an order of the District Court denying her motion
to quash summons and service of summons upon
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her ( R. 8-9), she alleged nothing to show inYalidit
1
of summons as issued nor any defect in persun~; 1
service of summons and copy of the complaint. She
alleged that her substantial rights vvere involYed ·in
that the question of the validity of service upon het
outside the State of Utah, upon an imp1·opnly dutul
return, would purportedly confer jurisdiction upon
the Utah District Court over her, and her propen1
interests in said action; so that a determination a)
to the correctness of such order as to whether thr:
Court has jurisdiction over her, or he1· rights in prnperty" should be made by intermediate appeal. (R 0
I tali cs added.)
Her motion which was denied by the District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah was a
motion
"to quash the purported issuance and senice of summons purportedly made upon her,
for and upon the following grounds, to-wit:
"That the return purporting to show senice of said summons upon the said Mrs. Farrell W. Kimball, does not show that it \ras,
pursuant to the requirements of Rule 4 (g),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as Amended,
made within five ( 5) days after service upon
said defendant; said service having been made
under date of February 15th, 1967, a penoclof
eight ( 8) days rather than five ( 5) days after
service." ( R. 1. Italics added.)
No affidavit was filed by appellant to disputr
either the validity of the summons as issued nor the
validity of personal service made upon her on Febri-
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7, 1967. She moved to quash the issuance of
summons and the service thereof, but predicated
her motion not on any purported defect in the sum, nwns itself nor in the service. She based her motion
. to quash solely on the fact that the return made by
! the deputy sheriff was dated eight (8) days after
personal service of summons on her instead of within five ( 5) days.
~d'\
rh~

ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
IT IS THE ACTUAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON DEFENDANT WHICH CONFERS
.JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OVER DEFENDANT. NOT THE SHERIFF'S RETURN
:JOR OTHER PROOF OF SERVICE.

Nowhere in the appellant's motion to quash the
issuance of summons nor in the motion to quash the
service of summons is there asserted any claim that
summons was not validly issued nor that it was not
ralidly served personally on the appellant at the time
the sheriff stated in his return that he made perwnal service upon said defendant. It is undisputed
Ihat defendant was personally served with summons
on February 7, 1967, together with a copy of the
complaint. The appellant in effect claims that the
summons and the service thereof on February 7,
1%7, subsequently became void simply because the
l'r:turn made by the Sheriff of Sacramento County,
California, was dated eight (8) days after the date
uf sen'ice instead of five ( 5) days.
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Appellant did not file any motion to quash th
return nor claim any defect in the return exc ~
that the sheriff's return was made three (3) d:p
after the date specified in Rule 4(g) of the Ut;~
Rules of Civil Procedure. The only straw at which
appellant could grasp was the delay of three (3) davs
in making the sheriff's return. The return itself h~d
nothing to do with the validity of the summons as
issued, nor with the validity of personal service actually made on the defendant.
Section 17-22-12, U. C. A. 1953, specifies:
"Return of process as prima-facie evidence. - - - The return of the sheriff upon process or notice is prima-facie evidence of the
facts in such return stated."
The sheriff's return attached to the summons
(R. 6-7), clearly shows that Arthur F. Phelps as
deputy sheriff of Sacramento County, California. on
February 6, 1967, received the summons and copy
of complaint, and that he "personally served said
summons and complaint on the 7th day of February,
1967, upon Mrs. Ferrell W. Kimball, the defendant
therein named, in the county of Sacramento, State
of California, by delivering to and leaving with the
said Mrs. Farrell W. Kimball, personally, a true
and correct copy of said summons and complaint'',
etc. The facts recited in the return are not disputed.
The evidence before this Court shows that defendant
was personally served with summons and copy of
complaint on February 7, 1967.

1.
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Appellant assumes that a summons properly
issued and validly served, subsequently became void
due to failure of the deputy sheriff who served it
to make his return within five days. In other words,
appellant contends in substance that a summons valid
when issued, and validly served, becomes void if the
sheriff or deputy who properly serves it, neglects
to make his return within five days after the date
of actual service.
This Honorable Court in Federal Land Bank
of Berkeley v. Brinton, et al., (1944), 106Utah149,
at 154, 146 P. 2d 200 at 201, stated the well established rule :
"The fact that service had been made, by
the weight of authority, may be proved or
a defective proof of service may be amended
after judgment. It is held that it is the fact
of service that gives jurisdiction, not the proof
of it ... "
In that case the affidavit of service of supplemental amended complaint was not made and filed
until three-and-one-half years after the alleged service. This Court further stated in that case in affirming the judgment:

"* * * Good practice would always commend adequate service and prompt filing of
return, notwithstanding the abundant authority to the effect that failure or omission to
make a return or proof of service is not such
an irregularity as to invalidate a judgment,
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serv~c~ having: been made. A ~umber of ai.i.
thonties a_re cited on the quest~on in the cast
of Bourge10us v. Santa Fe Trail Stages Inc
43 N.M. 453, 95 P. 2d 204."
'
'I

In Bourgeious 1'. Santa Fe Trail Stogrs, !Jic.,
43 N. M. 453, 95 P. 2d 204, cited by this Comt, the
New Mexico Supreme Court declared:

" ... The summons is the process bv which
the defendant is summoned to court. The re·
turn on the other hand is merely the e\·idence
by which the court is informed that the defend· '
ant has been given that indispensible notice
to appear in court, without which the court is
powerless to proceed. It is not, howe\·er, tht
return which gives the court jurisdiction."
The court further noted that with respect to
the return, "Its purpose is to apprise the court that
due service has been had upon the defendant."
In Clinton v. Miller, (Mont.) 226 P. 2d 487 at
495, the Court stated:
"The summons is the process by which
the defendant is summoned into court. The
purpose of serving a summons is to give notice
to the defendant and therebv afford him the
opportunity to defend himself or his property
- an essential to due process of law. Haggerty v. Sherburne Mercantile Co., 120 Mont. 386,
186 P. 2d 884.
"Process is employed only to obtain juns·
diction over the person of the defendant. State
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ex rel. Murphy v. Second Judicial District
Court, 99 Mont. 209, 41 P. 2d 113. That jurisdiction is acquired at the instant the summons
is served and before any proof of such service has been rnade ....
"After the summons is served and jurisdiction over the person of defendant is thus
obtained orderly procedure dictates that evi(lence be supplied of the fact that service has
been made. Where summons is personally
served upon a defendant by a sheriff the lattel' is required to make a statement in writing
of what has been done by him in making
such service which statement is usually either
endorsed on the summons or attached thereto. This written statement constitutes the officer's 'return'. * * * Such 'return' is merely
the evidence by which the court, the litigants,
their attorneys or others interested are inf orrned that the defendant has been served.
Compare Smith v. Hamill, 111 Mont. 585, 112
P. 2d 195. However, it is not the 'return' or
other evidence or proof of service which gives
the court jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant but it is the fact of service that
confers such jurisdiction.... " (Italics added
except last four italicized words.)
Since the appellant was validly served with a
valid summons and such fact is not disputed, the
District Court acquired jurisdiction over appellant,
and the District Court properly denied her motion
to quash issuance of summons and service of summons. The only objection asserted against the sheriff's return was that it was made three days after
it should have been made.
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POINT 2.
RULE 4(g) DOES NOT STATE THAT FAIL
URE OF THE SHERIFF OR HIS DEPUTY TO
MAKE A RETURN WITHIN FIVE DAYS IN.
VALIDATES EITHER THE SUMMONS OR THE
SERVICE THEREOF.
"
Nowhere in Rule 4 (g) is there any statemem
to support the contentions of appellant to the effect
that failure of the sheriff or his deputy to make 3
return within five ( 5) days renders either the sum
mons null and void or nullifies the service of sum.
mons. As pointed out in Bourgeious v. Santa Fe Trail
Stages, Inc., 43 N. M. 453, 95 P. 2d 204:
"The mere failure or omission to return
the summons with the proof of service is not
an irregularity which prevents the court from
conducting the suit in a due, orderly and proper manner. The defendant has been deprived
of no right by the failure to file the summons
with the proof of service. The requirements of
Sec. 105-306, supra, that the summons br
returned with the proof of service, is primarily
for the benefit of the court. Its purpose is to
apprise the court that due service has been
had upon the defendant."
Appellant has cited no case to support her contentions, and for want of appropriate legal authority
has cited cases which are not in point. Her contentions would make the validity of a summons or the
validity of service depend upon whether or not a
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sheriff or his deputy made his proof of service within five days. According to appellant, a valid service
of summons and copy of a complaint on a defendant
who is generally successful in avoiding service, could
be annulled by the inability of the sheriff to get
the returns made within the five days.
Sec. 17-22-13, U. C. A. 1953, provides:
"If a sheriff does not return without delay a process or notice in his possession with
the necessary endorsement thereon, he is liable
to the party aggrieved for all damages sustained by him."
Nowhere in either the statutes or in the Rules
of Civil Procedure do I find any provision to the
effect that if the sheriff or his deputy fails to make
his return within five days, the valid service of a
v-alid summons is rendered void by the delay. As
pointed out by the New Mexico Court, the return
of the sheriff or proof of service is "primarily for the
benefit of the court. Its purpose is to apprise the
court that due service has been had upon the defendant." It has been the rule for many years that a
defective return can be amended even after judgment for the reason that it is the actual service of
summons which confers jurisdiction on the court over
the defendant, not the return or other proof of service. Furthermore, service of summons is effective
the moment it is served, not when the sheriff makes
his return.
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CONCLUSION
The contentions of appellant are entirely with.
out merit for reasons hereinabove set forth, and b~
reason of the case law above cited. The defendant
and appellant was validly served personally wiili
a valid summons and copy of the complaint, and the
Court acquired jurisdiction over her by virtue of
that service. The District Court was not divested of
that jurisdiction by the delay of three days in the
making of the proof of service by the deputy sheriff,
The order of the District Court denying the motion to quash issuance of summons and service of
summons should be affirmed with costs to respond·
ent.
Respectfully submitted,
REED H. RICHARDS
500 Kennecott Bldg.
Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent

